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nessmen merely reacted passively to the actions of consumers or
actively shared the expectations of consumers, the end result was
the same: a sharp increase in demand on all market levels during
the buying waves and inventory accumulation by businessmen as
well as consumers.
Thus forward buying shaped the character of the inflationary
phase of the Korean expansion. Two associated expectations
doubtless influenced consumers and businessmen: the fear that
shortages would develop as a consequence of formal or informal
rationing and the belief that prices would increase. Such expecta-
tions may develop from time to time in the market for a particular
product as a result of special conditions which affect that market
alone. When many groups hold such expectations at the same
time, affecting many markets, the short-period potential for infla-
tion is great. That was the situation in the last half of 1950. The
volume of demand generated by the forward buying was itself suf-
ficient to create temporary shortages at existing prices, and as a
result prices advanced rapidly. As it turned out, serious shortages
of consumer goods did not develop in 1951. However, this might
have happened if consumers and businessmen had not accumulated
stocks in 1950 and early 1951, since the government substantially
increased its claim on the nation's resources in 1951.
The Deflationary Phase: 1951
A remarkable transformation of the character of the expansion oc-
curred during 1951. The rise in gross national product had been
vigorous during the inflationary phase; in 1951 it was moderate.
Rising prices accompanied rising production up to the first quarter
of 1951; falling wholesale prices and stable industrial production
were the dominant trends through the remainder of the year. In-
creasing activity characterized most sectors of the economy untIl
the early months of 1951, after which activity diminished in many
sectors.
This last point deserves amplification. In general, industries re-
lated to defense experienced an expansion of activity, while other
industries experienced a contraction. These tendencies may be
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demonstrated in a variety of ways. A large volume of defense
orders is placed with durable goods industries—and the production
of durable manufactures fluctuated within narrow limits in 1951
(Chart 2). The bulk of the products of the nondurable goods in-
dustries move into consumption—and the decline in the produc-
tion of nondurable manufactures in the last half of 1951 carried
the index below the level of the third quarter of 1950. Real ex-
penditures on consumer durables declined 14 per cent between
1950 and Total consumer expenditures, uncorrected for
price changes, declined sharply in the second quarter of 1951, and
remained below the first-quarter Tate through the Test of the year
(Chart 5).
The declin.e in consumer spending had important consequences
that quickly affected aggregate economic activity. As 1951 opened,
the production of consumer goods was geared to high and rising
sales of final products, as a result of the forward buying induced
by the developments in Korea. As retail sales began to decline in
February, retail stocks increased; by May they were 11 per cent
above the January level, whereas sales had fallen 7 per cent in the
same interval (Chart 7). After May, retail sales leveled off and
retailers restricted their purchases, so that stocks were drastically
reduced by the end of the year. The same pattern of accumulation
of stocks in the first half and liquidation in the second half of the
year prevailed in the wholesale sector. In contrast, manufacturers'
stocks grew throughout the year, despite the fact that sales fell off
in the last six months. The increase in manufacturers' stocks was
the result of increasing activity in defense industries, which more
than offset the reduced activity in consumer goods industries.8 The
net result of these various trends was an increase in inventory in-
vestment in the second quarter of 1951, followed by a decline in
the third and fourth quarters (Chart 6).
The decrease in inventory investment in the last half of 1951 was
7 Survey of Current Business, July 1953, Table A.
8 Ninety per cent of the increase in manufacturers' stocks between June and Decem-
ber took place in the durable goods industries. Such consumer goods industries as
furniture and fixtures, food and kindred products, beverages, textile mill products,
and leather products reduced their inventories in the second half of the year.
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not offset by a rise in fixed investment. Fixed investment expendi-
tures were closely controlled by government policy during 1951.
Private construction expenditures declined after the first quarter,
but expenditures on producer durable goods remained virtually
unchanged throughout the year. The decline in private construc-
tion was confined entirely to residential building; other private
construction increased. Public defense construction increased very
substantially.9 Expenditures on new plant and equipment by every
major industry group expanded between 1950 and 1951, but after
mid-1951 only the defense industries were increasing their capital
outlays.1° The capital-expansion programs of the consumer goods
industries were discouraged by materials allocations and by the
softening of consumer demand. Fixed investment in the defense
industries was encouraged directly by federal aid and indirectly by
the continued high level of activity that characterized those indus-
tries throughout the year.
It is easy to understand the expansion of activity in the defense
industries during 1951. The requirements of the defense program
dictated reductions in the output of consumer durable goods and
in the volume of residential construction, and these reductions
were implemented by various controls. But what factor or com-
bination of factors was responsible for the decline in consumer
spending after the first month or two of the year—the decline which
in turn reacted on inventory investment and fixed investment in
the consumer goods sector? It was that development which, by re-
ducing the demand for resources in the private sector, permitted
the transfer of resources to the government sector without exerting
a strong upward pressure on prices.
Supply of Consumer Goods in 1951
In contrast with 1942—1945, the decline in consumer expenditures
after the first quarter of 1951 was not forced by a shortage of con-
sumer goods. True, price controls were in effect, and restrictions
on materials did require reductions in the output of important
classes of consumer durable goods. However, at the very time that
° Survey of Current Business, July 1953, Table 31.
10 Ibid., June 1952, Table 2.
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these restrictions began to limit the output of consumer durables
—that is, in the second quarter of 1951—the demand for such goods
eased off, following the buying waves of the inflationary phase.
Sales of retail stores as a percentage of disposable personal income
were shown by quarters for 1950—1951 in Table 1. The sharp rise
in the retail sales of durable.goods relative to income during the
second buying wave was followed by a continuous decline through
the remainder of 1951. Especially noteworthy is the demand trend
in the dominant automotive group.
The demand for nondurable goods also eased early in 1951. Ex-
penditures for nondurables were relatively stable in 1951 (Chart 5),
but this over-all stability was the net result of opposing movements
of several of the major classes of nondurable goods. Apparel and
general merchandise stores experienced the greatest decline in sales
relative to income, while the sales of food stores and eating and
drinking places were well maintained. More generally, sales of
semidurable goods declined as expenditures for perishabies—pri--
manly food—increased. The decline in the sales of semidurables
cannot be explained in terms of a physical shortage of resources for
the production of such goods.
The most convincing evidence that the decline in consumer
spending was voluntary is provided by the ratio of stocks to sales in
retail stores (Chart 9). The over-all ratio for all retail stores was
far above the pre-Korea level at the time when sales began to de-
cline in early 1951. Even at the end of 1951, after the drastic reduc-
tion in retail stocks which took place during the last half of the
year, the stock-sales ratio was considerably higher than it had been
at the end of 1949 or before the outbreak of hostilities in June
1950." Thus goods were available in 1951; the reasons for the
decline in consumer spending must be sought elsewhere.
Household Stocks, Liquid Asset and
Changed Expectations
A forward buying movement is intrinsically a short-period phe-
nomenon. The consumer who purchases a car, refrigerator, or new
11 The over-all ratio does not conceal a shortage of durable goods—the statements in
the text also apply to the ratio for durable goods stores alone.
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suit a few months earlier than he intended is not likely to pur-
chase another for some time to come, and the housewife who ac-
cumulates a stock of sugar or coffee is not apt to lay in more than
a six-month supply. Furthermore, the purchase of expensive com-
modities either reduces liquid-asset holdings or requires the as-
sumption of new debt. According to estimates prepared by the
Securities and Exchange Commission,12 liquid saving by indi-
viduals decreased from $2.9 billion in 1949 to $1.5 billion in 1950
(virtually all of it saved during the fourth-quarter buying lull) as
disposable income increased $19 billion.'3 This low rate of aggre-
gate liquid saving must reflect dissaving by many individuals and
smaller than customary saving on the part of others.14 Other things
being equal, both the increase in household stocks and the growing
desire to replenish liquid-asset holdings or to retire debt would
tend to reduce consumer expenditures relative to current income
after a buying wave had been under way for a few months.15 Per-
haps these factors are sufficient to explain the downturn in retail
sales after January. On the other hand, forward buying might well
have persisted for a time had consumers continued to anticipate
future shortages. There can be little doubt, however, that a new
change of expectations removed the positive incentive to forward
12 Statistical Series, Release No. 1077, April 17, 1952. Liquid saving is defined there
as "saving in the form of currency and bank deposits, equity in savings and loan asso-
ciations, private and government insurance, securities, and repayment of mortgage
debt and other consumer debt." Liquid saving is therefore net of any increase in
consumer debt, which rose by $2.3 billion in 1949, $3.2 billion in 1950, and $0.4
billion in 1951.
13 In contrast, liquid saving increased to $13 billion in 1951 as disposable income
again rose $19 billion. Virtually none of the saving occurred during the first-quarter
buying wave.
14 According to the 1951 Survey of Consumer Finances, there was a decline in large
holdings ($2,000 or more) of liquid assets during 1950 and "a substantial increase from
the previous year in the proportion of consumers that reported using large amounts
[$500 or more] of liquid assets for purchases of durable goods." Furthermore, a!-
though the over-all frequency of dissaving declined in 1950, "consumers with incomes
of $3000 or more dissaved more frequently in 1950 than in 1949." 1951 Survey of Con-
sumer Finances, Part I, "The Economic Outlook and Liquid Asset Position of Con-
sumers," Federal Reserve Bulletin, June 1951, pp. 627—644.
15 If income were growing rapidly, the reduction in expenditures relative to income
might be reflected in a retardation in the rate of growth of consumer expenditures
rather than in an absolute decline. However, disposable income was growing slowly
in 1951, and expenditures declined as saving increased (see below, pp. 31—32 and
46—51).
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buying after the first few weeks of the year, although the precise
nature of the factors responsible for the change is somewhat
obscure.
The decline in retail sales began immediately after the general
price freeze was announced on January 26, 1951. Insofar as the
forward buying of consumers had been for the purpose of anticipat-
ing price advances, the establishment of price controls may have
removed one incentive for additional buying. However, one of the
facts most clearly established by the 1951 Survey of Consumer
Finances was that a substantial majority of consumers expected
price increases during 1951, and that very few expected price de-
clines. Furthermore, the survey, which was conducted in January
and February, stated, "Imposition of price controls at the end of
January 1951 had little immediate effect on consumer price ex-
pectations; opinions expressed in interviews taken before and after
the date that controls went into effect showed no difference on this
point." 16
At about the same time that the price freeze was announced, it
became apparent that retail stores were well stocked with goods.
Since businessmen as well as consumers had purchased heavily in
late 1950, and since the defense program had not interfered seri-
ously with civilian production, an increased flow of goods matched
the increase in final demand, and the anticipated shortages did not
develop. This concrete evidence of a plentiful supply of goods
was probably the most important reason for the shift in consumer
expectations. However, it does not follow that changed price ex-
pectations played no part.
The major findings on the state of price expectations reported
in the 1951 Survey of Consumer Finances were summarized as
follows: 17
Consumers were more generally agreed on the trend of in the coming
year than at the time of any previous postwar survey. Approximately 7 of
every 10 spending units thought that prices would rise. Very few believed that
prices would fall. Despite the belief that prices would not fall, about one-half
of all consumers said that this was a bad time to buy durable goods, principally
18 Loc. cit.
17 Ibid., p. 628.
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because prices were too high. About one-third of all consumers thought that
this was a good time to buy, before prices went higher or shortages developed.
Why should consumers wish to defer purchases of durable goods
because prices were "too high" if at the same time they expected
prices to rise further? The last sentence in the quotation suggests
an answer which is consistent with all the findings. Apparently
only a minority of consumers expected shortages to develop, and
it may therefore be inferred that only a minority expected rapidly
advancing prices. Although consumers were asked to express an
opinion about the probable trend of prices during 1951, they were
not questioned on the magnitude of the change they expected.
Even if people did not believe that price controls would stop the
inflation, they surely believed that the controls would slow the rate
of advance. But if this were the case, the penalty for postponed
buying would not be severe, and there was no urgent reason to buy
immediately—after all, goods were plentiful at current prices. Un-
der the circumstances, some retrenchment from the abnormal rates




In the most general terms, a 'mobilization program will promote
an expansion in production, prices, or both if it results in an in-
crease in spending on newly produced goods and services. How
might that result come about? It is convenient to classify the pos-
sibilities under three headings:
1. The direct effects of increased defense expenditures. These
include both government expenditures and the fraction of pri-
vate investment that is intimately tied to defense production.
2. Increased expenditures induced by income growth.
3. Increased expenditures induced by changes in expectations that
are independent of income growth.
A factor will be described as inflationary if it leads to an increase
in total spending. The question of the relative changes in produc-
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